Defing Intelligence: Between Statecraft, Markets, And Morality

By ROS Sayumphu, Senior Researcher of the Sala Traju Association

I. Introduction

When someone hears the word “intelligence,” it is almost inevitable that they will associate the term with spying and keeping secrets. When they hear this, most people, including the average person,
are likely to think of well-known fiction movies, such as James Bond. This is due to the fact that intelligence is a broad concept that can refer to a wide variety of different activities. It contains elements such as action, thriller, suspense, guns, and others; however, it is unclear to what extent these activities reflect the actual intelligence that exists in reality, and whether or not they reflect
a universal definition of intelligence that may or may not be uniformly practiced by all states and actors on earth.

The current understanding of intelligence activities, it is argued in this article, reflects the western approach the majority of the time and does not provide a definition that is universal and can be utilized in any circumstance. This article will start by taking a look at the current definitions of the topic,
as well as the actors involved. In the following section of the article, an argument will be made suggesting that the degree of intelligence that can be observed in people of various cultures can vary quite a bit from one another.

II. Trying to Define Intelligence

The academic field of intelligence, emerging from international relations, did not emerge until the latter half of the 20th century, just like many other academic subfields did not do so until that time (Dexter, Phythian and Strachan-Morris, 2017: 922). In years gone by, gathering intelligence was synonymous with activities such as espionage and the guarding of secrets (Falode, 2021: 71-72). The implementation of intelligence has developed over the course of time in response to both the natural progression of events and to outside influences such as the advancement of technology (O’Connell, 2005: 146). The efforts that are being made to provide a uniform interpretation of intelligence are complicated as a direct result of the lack of academic literature and due to the evolving of the world that effect the interpretation of the term (Phythian, 2008: 4-5).

The gathering and analysis of intelligence was accorded a significant amount of focus prior and during both of the world wars; however, during the time of the cold war, this focus was elevated to an even higher level (Whitaker, 1992: 113). As a direct consequence of this, intelligence operations can be carried out at any given time through either technological intelligence (also known as TECHINT), collecting information online or through other digital devices, or human intelligence (also known as HUMINT), using human asset to collect intelligence (Whitaker, 1992: 114). Despite the fact that the intelligence community’s attention has gradually shifted to involve itself in TECHINT as a result of the progression of technology, the significance of human intelligence has not decreased (Wilford, 2022: 519). What exactly does it mean to be intelligent now that we’ve arrived at this point? There is a clear distinction between the methods of intelligence collection that rely on TECHINT and those that rely on HUMINT, yet as was mentioned, the discreet nature of intelligence remains essential and protecting people’s or source’s  anonymity while collecting intelligence is an essential part of the process (Kamiński, 2019: 88). That requires either the collection of information that is not readily available to the general public or the extraction of information from sources that is either confidential or protected by employing TECHINT or HUMINT on the information in question (Breakspear, 2013: 686-687). In a similar fashion, there is a debate regarding intelligence operations, which include activities that extent beyond just gathering of information, to include others such as, the evaluation of information, as well as counterintelligence and operation, whether a fulfilled intelligence definition must satisfied all activities above (Breakspear, 2013: 685).

The significance of definition of state espionage, first, will be emphasized further in the following section. The idea that states engage in intelligence operations or activities is not a novel one; rather, it is an idea that has been repackaged and given a new label (Falode, 2021: 72). In order to ensure the safety of the nation, the goal of intelligence is to assist with the defeat of the adversary and emerge victorious which will be accomplished by gaining an advantage over them (Shiraz and Aldrich, 2019: 1317-1318). The intelligence operation has been utilized by states an uncountable number of times, as was mentioned earlier. Since the turn of the previous century, for example, Sun Tzu’s military tactician has also been known to mention it (Graaff, 2020: 1). In both of the world wars, intelligence was used to gain advantages or to win battles; later, during the cold war, it became even vital (Sherr, 1994: 56). The usage in the 21st century has been just as important, if not more so than in previous centuries (Yılmaz, 2017: 31).

In addition, understanding intelligence requires more than just looking at it from a political or a military angle. It’s possible that this definition doesn’t cover everything. The rise of technology as well as the strengthening of international relations are both factors that contribute to the economic interdependence of countries (Nikoloski, 2016: 46). As a consequence of this, the movement toward neoliberalism in the 21st century suggests that the economy can be a source of power as well as competition. Therefore, it is absolutely necessary to have a comprehensive understanding of the operations of the economic intelligence community. There are a variety of perspectives held among the states regarding this economic intelligence, which relates to the realm of economics. The concept and practice of intelligence, in addition to the activities that are associated with intelligence, are almost entirely a product of colonialism or westernization; as a result, the input has a strong root from western civilization which resulted in neoliberalism (Aldrich and Kasuku, 2012: 1011). The act of stealing trade secrets, information regarding an opponent’s economic position or strategy, or intellectual property rights can all fall under the category of economic espionage (Fraumann, 2017: 304). This practice allows states to gain an economic advantage over a rival which is part of the national interest and survival (Lotrionte, 2015: 452). One holds the belief that the use of economic intelligence for the purpose of ensuring the security of a state is acceptable; however, the use of economic intelligence to support one’s own private markets and tradecraft is considered unacceptable (Lotrionte, 2015: 472). On the other hand, some states consider it to be completely unacceptable that is economic espionage poses comparable threats to the states (Wang, 2016: 550).

In general, the purpose of state intelligence is to achieve and then sustain a position of superiority vis-à-vis one’s adversary or opponent. This is the ultimate goal of state intelligence. It has also been suggested that intelligence is more than just the act of gathering information; rather, it involves critically analyzing the raw data in order to produce an analysis that is more substantial and of higher value (Oyedokun et al., 2022: 52). In response, the information, whether it is raw data or an analysis of the raw data, may then, to some extent, and depending on the actors, conduct counterintelligence or operations that are required to dissuade or gain an advantage over the adversaries (Handel, 1990: 1-2). There is a school of thought that maintains intelligence operations are in a state of constant war even when peacetime is in session (Phythian, 2008: 57). It is important to reemphasize that states relies on intelligence to secure and maintain national security. Everything revolves around the safety and interests of the state.

To circle back around to time as well as other factors, such as advancements in technology, the intelligence industry in the private sector has been steadily growing over the past few decades. Following the collection and examination of the data, it is now possible to use the intelligence to gain a competitive advantage in the business world or on the market by private actors (Crane, 2005: 234). Because the world is ruled by a capitalist system, it is possible to argue that the competition between private companies to amass a great deal of wealth in order to dominate the global market is not irresponsible (Price, 2014: 45). However, this assertion is highly debatable. On the other hand, the private sector must be almost entirely obligated to the law and must operate in conjunction with the law, whereas this may not be the case for the intelligence and operation of the state (Cloutier, 2013: 62). These requirements must be met in order for the private sector to function properly or it would run the risk of coming across a law suit (Crane, 2005: 234). The intelligence community that works in the private sector is well prepared and well trained for a professional career, which may or may not involve fewer covert activities than the intelligence community that works for the state (Robson Morrow, 2022: 412). It is possible to obtain information from both TECHINT and HUMINT, however, access to this information is more restricted, and public information is used more frequently. In other word, it is possible to obtain information from both of these sources, it is more common to use public information (Hou and Wang, 2020: 4). The idea of the business intelligence operation is to collect useful information including the added value skills or operation to further enhance the success of the industry (Crane, 2005: 234). That is, in order for the business, to have an edge over the competitors and to accumulate benefits over its adversary. The collection of the intelligence then proceeded to the analytic procedure and put forward to the decision makers for further steps (Hou and Wang, 2020: 5). It is almost a similar process to the state intelligence, however, the scope, objectives, resources, actors, and pool of information can be limited and much narrower for the business intelligence (Hou and Wang, 2020: 5).

However, business intelligence or industrial intelligence can also be used in conjunction with state intelligence if there is sufficient coordination between the two. One illustration of this would be the dissemination of technical intelligence to state governments for the purpose of empowering those governments to carry out intelligence-related operations (Trim, 2002: 12). Accordingly, to some extent, the operations of both the intelligence unit and the company can be legally sanctioned provided that they comply with the laws, morality, and ethics that are currently in place (Nasheri, 2009: 2). In tandem with this development, there has been a rise in the number of unwelcome business intelligence operations. Theft of a trade secret, theft of critical business information by installing viruses on an adversary’s business competitor, or eavesdropping on or hacking into the system of an adversary’s business competitor in such a way as to violate the law-protected principle of good faith and fair play in commercial competition are examples of actions that may have crossed the line (Fraumann, 2017: 304). In addition, a significant cause for concern is that a commercial organization might provide the government with access to the data of its customers, in addition to vital information that is privately held. In this particular instance, the United States’ companies that are responsible for hosting billions of users has worked together with the government of the United States to provide intelligence to the government (Trim, 2002: 12).

Intelligence gathering is also carried out by a variety of other actors, including well-structured organization such as international organizations or non-governmental organizations (NGOs) or even terrorist groups. It is crucial for that organization, for example, the United Nations, to have adequate resources to gather information, analyze information, and respond in order to fulfill the purposes of the United Nations that is to ensure international peace and security (Ekpe, 2007: 379). To what extent the intelligence that is used  for United Nations is ordinary information/an open source or of a valuable, discrete nature, however, remains uncertain (Abilova and Novosseloff, 2016: 7). In contrast, NGOs typically have fewer resources and expertise, as a result, their operations can be limited to what is feasible, such as open source, and are not as sophisticated as those of large organizations; they typically serve a specific purpose, such as human rights (Blancke, 2010: 165). The terrorist can use intelligence, in also a limited scope, to uncover the target’s vulnerabilities in order to instill fear in them (Richard H. Shultz and Beitler, 2004: 61-62). Due to the fact that the terrorist organization has somewhat access to TECHINT, it is possible that they will combine force with HUMINT in order to achieve their objectives (Richard H. Shultz and Beitler, 2004: 57). By attempting to define intelligence and analyzing how different actors perceive the topic, it is possible to argue that a pattern is forming that gives priority to information, whether open or confidential, that will be used for the benefit of the respective entity.

Two proposed, arguably, universal definitions of intelligence are as follow:

“Intelligence is the capacity for reasoned foresight that enables advantageous action
(Cox,  2022: 205).”

“Intelligence is a corporate capability to forecast change in time to do something about it. The capability involves foresight and insight, and is intended to identify impending change, which may be positive, representing opportunity, or negative, representing threat (Breakspear, 2013: 688).”

The definitions that are presented here capture the development of intelligence activities as well as the practices of actors, which, if all goes well, will eventually evolve into a definition that is more acceptable for all. Despite this, perhaps the situation may not be accurate in reality. For example, both the United States and the United Kingdom gather intelligence in similar way, but their interpretation can be different to one another. The former prioritizes data that has been refined and analyzed, whereas the latter, priority is given to information that has not been processed (Breakspear, 2013: 684).

In addition, the culture and practice of intelligence in the western world do not in any way, shape, or form reflect the culture and practice of the rest of the world. The major states, in terms of the practices that they observe in their respective societies may not acknowledge other existing methods and interpretation on the matter, the argument will be further investigate in the next section. On the other hand, it is not entirely clear whether activities involving intelligence always yield advantages over competitors or whether intelligence can also be used to maintain the status quo and strategic purposes. Some actors are unable or not interested in taking offensive action because they do not have the necessary resources at their disposal or not their nature such as the United Nations. Even if there is an attempt to have a universal definition, there are still gaps and questions that need to be resolved.

III. Distinct Priority Distinct Definition of Intelligence

The definition of intelligence discussed in earlier section demonstrates that there has been various understanding of what intelligence is, resulting from various actors and process involved. In this section of the article, the author will dive into the regimes and priorities that different actors have that causes the different interpretation of the definition of intelligence, particularly states.

Objectively, the western nations may have in mind a definition that emphasizes the foreign policy or international aspects of intelligence gathering (Scott and Jackson, 2004: 152). Making adversarial states weak or gaining a position of strength against opposition states is the primary objective of western nations (Crosston, 2016: 113). To bolster their claims of superiority over the rest of the world, western nations may seek to normalize and universalize their perception of intelligence (Aldrich and Kasuku, 2012: 1011). The reality, however, is that intelligence operations are not always conducted to support foreign policy, but also should be accounted for the survival and development of states for others (Duyvesteyn, 2011: 525). It is not to be deployed to support, for instance, maintaining the liberal system as in the United States and European Unions, but rather to support temporary strategic conditions that each country faces most frequently, such as NATO relevance and expansion for Russia, internal disturbance for China, and Pakistan’s nuclear proliferation for India (Crosston, 2016: 112). Therefore, the idea of intelligence, beside the power western nations, may not necessarily be associated with external advantages, but rather with disturbances that are closer to home.

At the same time, the interpretation or what should constitute as intelligence or information cannot be defined similarly. While western nations to sugar coat their intelligence operation as ethical and discreet sources or a targeted source, while the rest of the world does not have such luxury and can only extract information from any available source, not just intelligence-worthy ones (Aldrich and Kasuku, 2012: 1020). That is, comparing societies can yield varying results concerning their informational sources. Western civilization claims that their intelligence activities an open, technical, and ethical evaluation of informants (Graaff, 2020: 8). Their claims, however, appear inconsistent, as revealed by Edward Snowden’s disclosures, which demonstrated that the U.S. government has systematically violated the rights to privacy of both its own citizens and individuals worldwide through extensive surveillance practices. On the contrary, other society, such as the Arab world, it is unclear to what extent intelligence can be gleaned openly due to different context and culture as the society is not accustomed to it and is not trusted to share or open up on such matters (Rezk, 2016: 227). Intelligence’s problematic definition makes it difficult to distinguish between a secret and information that the western nations prioritized the former (Gill and Phythian, 2018: 20). The latter does not possess a secretive or mysterious nature. When actors ultimately define security or are threatened by various harms, the concern may not be to entice the state besides the first world to utilize mysterious information but rather to utilize all available information, including sources from the media, articles and similar fashion, and any vague information to their advantage (Aldrich and Kasuku, 2012: 1020). Therefore, the intended objectives, purposes, and strategic cultures among states differ and undoubtedly alter the understanding of the term information and intelligence.

Additionally, other aspects of the political system hugely affect defining intelligence. As stated, democratic nations typically choose policies that permit freedom of information and access to information, which satisfies their intelligence needs (Yin and Taylor, 2008: 16). In addition, liberal nations tend to work together, as they did during the cold war, in order to contain communism and diminish its influence (Whitaker, 1992: 125). Therefore, the purpose of intelligence is not limited to obtaining and acquiring information about specific things; it also includes the operation of intelligence that causes chaos in society to destabilize a regime that does not serve the purpose of democracy or does not serve the purpose of liberal world (Sulick, 2015: 49). In contrast, the nature of democracy and other political systems diverges when discussing the target of protection. Democratic nations focus on national interest and security, while other focuses on protecting the safety of the party or the top elites but also the national interest (McDougal et al., 1973: 384-385). The Democratic society works toward keeping in check a foreign threat (Crosston, 2016: 112). With that said, what is defined as threats among societies can be different, what is defined as information and intelligence can be different, and the political system can greatly affect the interpretation and procedures of the conducting intelligence.

IV. Conclusion

To put it succinctly, the intelligence operation in the 21st century has significantly increased since the turn of the century. HUMANINT will, without a doubt, continue to be significant despite the development of technology yet, at the same time, TECHINT will increasingly become critical. In other words, technology has led to an increase in the reliance on HUMINT. The idea of intelligence, which refers to the source of information that can be extracted from both online and offline sources, has also been shaped as a result of this development. The differences of interpretation of the term intelligence can be due to the one-of-a-kind culture, resources, goals, and beliefs that states uphold. These differences have an effect not only on the processes involved in intelligence gathering but also on our understanding of what we mean when we refer to intelligence. At the same time, new actors, such as international organization, private entities and non-governmental institutions, have altered the existing definition and moved beyond the emphasis on states to create the current understanding of intelligence. The current understanding of intelligence is in part shaped by western literature. In the same vein, due to the various security concerns that are placed on different actors, it is extremely difficult to arrive at a unified definition of intelligence. There is little chance of there being a uniform strategic culture across different societies. While this is true, the aftermath of the cold war also plays a role in the division and prioritization of democratic and communist states with regard to the definition of universal terms of intelligence and the procedure for associating them.

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To cite this article: ROS Sayumphu, DEFINING INTRLLIGENCE: BETWEEN STATECRAFT, MARKET, AND MORALITY, Bulletin Issue 8 (Special Issue) A Collection of Research Articles Dedicated to Khmer Scholars, January 2025.